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Abstract 
Streicher, T., Independence of the induction principle and the axiom of choice in the pure calculus 
of constructions, Theoretical Computer Science 103 (1992) 395-408. 
In this paper we define a model of the pure Calculus of Constructions (CoC) where the induction 
principle over data types defined by second-order quantification and several versions of the axiom 
of choice are not valid. 
Instead the model validates the nonconstructive principle of proof by contradiction, i.e. in the 
model under consideration the proposition (Vp:Prop) ((p + I) + I) + p contains a proof object 
(where I is the empty proposition (Vp:Prop) p, representing falsity). 
0. Introduction 
In the mid-1980s Huet and Coquand have proposed the Calculus of Constructions 
(CoC) as a common generalization of de Bruijn’s AUTOMATH and the polymorphi- 
tally typed A-calculus of Girard, see [2]. The main intention of CoC has been to 
provide a typed functional language which allows the representation of propositions 
and constructive proofs of propositions of intuitonistic higher-order logic as types 
and objects of types, respectively. 
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For this purpose CoC is fully adequate. But it has also been claimed that one 
can represent data types in CoC as certain propositional types-the “polymorphically 
deJined data types”-by second-order universal quantification in a way that general- 
izes Church’s representation of natural numbers as certain A-terms, the so-called 
Church numerals, and to use CoC for extracting functional programs from construc- 
tive proofs. To some extent both claims are true, but only in a rather restricted sense. 
It is true that all algorithmic functions on free data structures whose termination 
can be proved in higher-order logic can be expressed inside CoC. This is true already 
for the polymorphically typed A-calculus. But, as we show in this paper, it is 
impossible to prove the induction principle over polymorphically defined data types 
inside CoC. Therefore, if one considers e.g. the type PolyNat of polymorphic natural 
numbers, then there are very few provably inhabited propositions of the form 
(Vx:PolyNat) (3y:PolyNat) P(x, _Y). The very reason for the unprovability of the 
induction principle in CoC is that there exists a model of CoC where the induction 
principle over, e.g., polymorphic natural numbers is not realized due to the existence 
of nonstandard objects in the interpretation of PolyNat, i.e. objects which do not 
arise as denotations of Church numerals. 
The problem with the extraction of programs from constructive proofs is that the 
extraction algorithm can be formulafed inside CoC but one cannot prove its correctness 
inside CoC. The reason is that the axiom of choice and even the weaker axiom of 
unique choice are not provable in CoC. This, again, will be shown by proving that 
in our model already the axiom of unique choice is not realized. 
We want to remark that the results we are going to prove are not unexpected at 
all. The inventors of CoC already recognized the defects described above, since all 
attempts to prove in CoC the induction principle over polymorphically defined data 
types or the axiom of (unique) choice have failed. But in order to confirm this 
impression by proving that there is no chance of finding such derivations it is of 
advantage to use semantical methods, as both the induction principle over poly- 
morphically defined data types and the axiom of (unique) choice are consistent 
with CoC and therefore one has no chance to disprove them. Thus the only possibility 
to show the underivability by a syntactic argument would be by induction on the 
structure of derivations in CoC, which seems fairly clumsy. 
1. An amazingly classical, nevertheless constructive model of CoC 
By adapting the realizability model of CoC as described e.g. in [3,6-g] we shall 
show that it is consistent with CoC to assume that there is a proof object for the 
proposition (Vp:Prop) ((p + I) -+ I) +p (where I is the proposition (Vp:Prop) p 
representing falsity). Intuitively, this means that there is a nontrivial model of CoC 
whose propositional part is not too different from classical logic in the sense that 
the principle of proofby contradiction is valid: for all propositions p there is a proof 
object for the proposition lip + p. 
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First we recall the definition of the category w-Set of realizability sets which has 
been introduced by Hyland and Moggi in their pioneering work on the semantics 
of polymorphically typed A-calculus. 
Definition 1.1. A realizability set or o-set is a pair X = (X, IF-X) such that X is a set 
and IE-x is a surjective relation from w to X, i.e. for any x E X there exists n E w 
such that n lEx x. But, of course, this does not require that Ikx is always total, i.e. 
it is not necessarily the case that any number realizes some object. 
A realizable morphism from X to Y is a (set-theoretic) function f:X+ Y for 
which there exists n E w such that for all x E X and m E w with m It, x the result 
of {n}(m) is defined and {n}(m) It-Yf(~). A s common in recursion theory-see e.g. 
[5]-we write {n}(m) for the application of the nth partial recursive function to 
the number m. 
The category whose objects are o-sets and whose morphisms are the realizable 
morphisms between w-sets will be denoted as w-Set. 
The category w-Set carries a lot of interesting structure: it is locally Cartesian 
closed and regular, see e.g. [7], and contains the natural number object QI = 
(w, {(n, n) / n E co}). But it is not exact as splitting of equivalence relations would 
give rise to the effective topos. As it is locally Cartesian closed it is a model of the 
logical fragment of Martin-Lof’s type theory. 
Based on w-Set one can define a model of CoC where propositional types are 
those small realizability sets where any number realizes at most one object. This 
model construction is an extension of Hyland and Moggi’s model for polymorphi- 
tally typed h-calculus. A detailed description of this model can be found e.g. in [S]. 
Definition 1.2. The category w-Set contains a model of CoC which is given by a 
so-called generic morphism gen_per : Ext + Per. The w-set Per = (PER, lkp) has as 
its underlying set the set PER of all partial equivalence relations on w and for all 
R E PER it holds that n IF,. R for all n E w. Thus P~J carries the trivial realizability 
structure. The w-set &t= (T, /ET) has as its underlying set T the set {(R, M) 1 R E 
PER and M E w/R} and for all (R, M) E T and n E w we have n It7 (R, M) iff 
n E M. Then the morphism gen-per: Ext +Per is defined as the projection on the 
first component and is realized by any total recursive function. 
A display map is any morphism in w-Set which can be obtained as a pullback of 
the generic morphism gen-per along some realizable morphism. Display maps can 
be characterized by the following property: a morphism f: Y-, X is a display map 
iff for any n E w and y, y’~ Y with f(y) =f(y’) and n IkY y, y’ it holds that y = y’, 
i.e. fibrewise objects are determined uniquely by their realizers. 
In [7,8] it has also been shown that display maps are closed under pullbacks 
along arbitrary morphisms in w-Set and under composition. Furthermore, all 
isomorphisms in w-Set are display maps and whenever f: X + _I is an arbitrary 
realizable morphism and a : 4 + X is a display map then n, a is a display map, 
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too. This latterproperty is most important as it allows to interpret impredicative universal 
quantljication. 
Already in [7] variations of this standard realizability model have been considered 
in order to obtain independence results for concepts of theories of dependent types. 
One of these models is used to show that there is a model of CoC where all 
(extensional) identity types are propositional, but where propositions are not closed 
under strong sums of families of propositional types indexed over propositional 
types and propositional types are not closed under equalizers and therefore one 
does not even have weak sums of families of propositional types indexed over 
arbitrary types. 
The same model will be used in this paper to prove that the induction principle 
over polymorphically defined data types and the axiom of (unique) choice are not 
derivable in CoC. 
This model is obtained from the standard one by restricting the set of propositions, 
i.e. we do not allow arbitrary pers as propositions, but we consider only those pers 
which are either empty or of the form [X + w] for some w-set X. 
The details are explained in the following definition. 
Definition 1.3. Let PROP be the subset of PER consisting of all those pers R which 
are either empty or strongly functional which means that there exists an w-set X 
such that for all n,m E w: n R m iff for all x E X and k,k’ lFx x it holds that {n}(k) = 
{ m}( k’), i.e. both sides are defined and equal. That means that a strongly functional 
per R can be described in the following way: there is an w-set X such that n R m 
iff both n and m realize the same elements in [X + ~1. 
Let Prop denote the o-set whose underlying set is PROP and whose underlying 
realizability relation IFPRo,, is inherited from & and therefore also trivial. Let &f 
be the w-set obtained from &t by restricting to those pairs (R, M) where R E PROP 
The new generic morphism gen :&f+ Prop again is the projection on the first 
component and it is obtained by pulling back the old generic morphism gen-per 
along the inclusion of Prop into Per. 
A family of propositions is any display map which can be obtained as a pullback 
of gen along some morphism with codomain Prop. An w-set X is called a proposi- 
tional type iff the terminal projection from X to the terminal object 1 is a family of 
propositions. 
There is a propositional type J&t carrying the structure of a natural number object 
where Nat = (0, /FNaf) and m IFNet n iff {m}k = n for all k E w and zero is the unique 
object of Nat realized by iik.0 and succ: Nat -+ Nat is the unique morphism realized -- 
by An.Am.{n}(m) + 1 (here the notation An.t stands for functional abstraction on 
the level of codes, see e.g. [9]). 
Independence of induction principle and axiom qf choice from pure CoC 399 
Obviously, strongly functional pets are related to the notion of exfensionaf pers 
invented by Rosolini and described in [lo] w.r.t. their relevance for effective domain 
theory. 
Convention. In order to be more concise we shall call objects of Prop simply 
propositions and we shall not always distinguish carefully between a proposition as 
an object of Prop and its associated propositional type which is an o-set. Arbitrary 
w-sets often will be referred to simply as rypes. Furthermore, for ease of exposition 
we also do not distinguish between syntactic expressions of CoC and their denota- 
tions in our model. It should be clear from the context which is meant. 
Next we show that the structure defined above actually is a model for CoC. 
Lemma 1.4. The product of a family of propositions indexed over an arbitrary o-set is 
again (isomorphic to) a proposition. 
Proof. Let X be an w-set and P, be a proposition for all x E X. If for some x E X 
the proposition P.Y is empty then the product (n x:X) P, is empty, too. Otherwise 
for all x E X the proposition p, is of the form [ _Y, + QJ] for some w-set Y,. But 
then, obviously, the w-set (n x:X) [ _Y, + w] is isomorphic to the w-set [(C x:X) _Y, + 
w] (by a dependent type version of currying) and therefore (isomorphic to) a strongly 
functional proposition. cl 
A fairly obvious, but nevertheless amazing consequence of our definition is that 
there exist infinitely many realizers which for any nonempty proposition realize 
some proof object for that proposition. 
Lemma 1.5. For any code n, of a constant total (recursive) function it holds that for 
all nonempty propositions p the code n, realizes some element of p. 
Proof. If p is a nonempty proposition then it is of the form [X + w] and therefore 
any constant total recursive function realizes some (constant) realizable morphism 
in[X+w]. 0 
Lemma 1.5 makes a somewhat miraculous claim: for nonempty propositions we 
can uniformly choose a proof object. That means that for nonempty propositions 
one can find a proof object without looking at the proposition too carefully: it is 
enough to know that the proposition is inhabited. 
Lemma 1.6. In the model under consideration the following properties are valid. 
(a) The proposition I = (Vp:Prop) p representing falsity is empty. 
(b) If p is the empty proposition then p + _L contains exactly one element. 
(c) If p is a nonempty proposition then p--z I is empty. 
(d) For any proposition p it holds that p is nonempty i# (p + I) + I is nonempty. 
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Proof. (a) If there were an object t E (Vp:Prop) p, then t(p) E p for any proposition 
p. Taking for p the empty proposition we get the contradiction that the empty 
proposition is inhabited. Thus _L = (Vp:Prop) is the empty proposition. 
(b) If p is the empty proposition then p + I contains exactly one element since 
there exists exactly one realizable function from the empty type to some other type. 
(c) If p is a nonempty proposition then proposition p-+1 is empty since the 
assumption that there were a realizable function f from p to _L would imply that 
there is an element f(x) in I where x is some element in p which must exist due 
to the assumption that p is nonempty. 
(d) From (b) and (c) it follows immediately that p is nonempty iff p + I is empty 
iff (p+_L)+.l is nonempty. q 
Thus double negation is a constructive way of reflecting all propositions to the 
propositions containing at most one element. 
Having collected all these basic observations we are able to prove the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 1.7. The proposition (Vp:Prop) (( p + 1) + I) + p is nonernpty and contains 
infinitely many objects. 
Proof. Let n,, E w. If for some proposition p the proposition (p -f I) + I is nonempty 
then p itself is nonempty and therefore contains an object realized by the constant 
total recursive function coded by Ak.n,,. 
Therefore the total recursive function coded by An.Am.Ak.n, realizes some object 
in the proposition (Vp:Prop) ((p + I) -+ I) + p. 
Of course, if n, E w and n,, # n, and p is a proposition containing more than one 
element, i.e. p is of the form [X + w ] for some nonempty w-set 8, then Ak.n, and 
Ak.n, realize different constant functions in [X + ~1, i.e. different objects in p. 
Therefore An.Am.Ak,n, and An.Am.k.n, realize different objects in (Vp:Prop) ((p+ 
i)+l)+p. 0 
The previous theorem does show that the underlying logic of our model is in 
some sense classical although it is far from being simply two-valued, since most of 
the propositions contain infinitely many different proof objects-the only exceptions 
are the propositions containing at most one object! This is a phenomenon which is 
quite unexpected from the point of view of propositions-as-types, since proof 
semantics was considered as typical or even possible only for intuitionistic logics. 
But, of course, there is no term t in CoC for which one can formally prove the 
judgement t E (Vp:Prop) ((p + I) + I) +p, as in the full PER model of Definition 
1.2 this proposition is empty. In proof-theoretic terms this means that there is no 
uniform extensional i.e. h-definable, procedure for transforming for any proposition 
p proofs of (p + I) + I into proofs of p. 
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2. Underivability of the induction principles 
We will proceed by showing that polymorphic representations of free data struc- 
tures contain injinitely many nonstandard elements. 
By ,free data structures we mean the carrier sets of free term algebras over a 
signature. If f,, . . . , fn are operation symbols with arity a, =p,,, + * . . +p,,arci,+ 
Pc,ar(i)+l for i = 1, . . . , n where the pc,; are included in the list p,, . . . , pI of sort 
symbols, then, according to [4], the polymorphic representation of the ith carrier 
set of the corresponding free term algebra is 
(Vp,:Prop) . . . (Vpk:Prop) a,+. . .+a,+pi. 
If k = 1, n 2 1 and a, = p, . . . , a, = p one gets the polymorphic representation of the 
free data structure generated by n different constants, and if one chooses k = 1, 
n = 2 and a, = (p +p) and a,=p then one gets the proposition PolyNat= 
(vp:Prop)(p~p)~(p~p). 
We shall show that even in these most simple cases the polymorphic representation 
when interpreted in our model contains infinitely many nonstandard objects, i.e. 
objects which do not arise as denotations of terms of CoC. 
Theorem 2.1. If k = 1, n 2 1 and a, =. . . = a, = p, = p then the type (Vp:Prop) a, + 
’ . ’ + a, + p contains in,finitely many elements which are not syntactically de$nable by 
terms of CoC. 
Proof. For any natural numbers i and any nonempty proposition p the algorithm 
A1.i realizes some element in p. Therefore for any natural number i the algorithm 
r, = Ak.Am,. . . . Am,,.Al.i realizes some element ei in (Vp:Prop) a, +. * . + a, +p. 
If i and j are different natural numbers and p is a proposition containing more 
than one element then the algorithms A1.i and A1.j realize different objects in p. 
Therefore the algorithms r, and r, realize different objects e, and e, in (Vp:Prop) a, + 
*..+a,+p. 
The only syntactically representable elements of (Vp:Prop) a, 9 . . + a,, -+ p are 
of the form ci 5 (Ap:Prop) (Ax,:p) . . . (hx,:p) x, for some i with 14 i s n. Thus for 
any i with 1 s i G n, natural number j and proposition p containing more than one 
object, c,(p) is a function which is not constant, whereas e,(p) is a constant function. 
Therefore ci and e, are different. 0 
In a similar way one can show that the polymorphic representation of natural 
numbers contains infinitely many objects which are not denotable by terms of CoC. 
Theorem 2.2. The type PolyNat = (Vp:Prop) (p + p) + p + p contains infinitely many 
elements which are not syntactically representable, i.e. do not arise as (denotations of) 
Church numerals. 
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Proof. For any natural number i the algorithm Ak.Al.An.Am.i realizes an element 
e, in PolyNat as whenever a proposition p is nonempty then Ami realizes an element 
in p. For natural numbers i and j with i #j the objects e, and e, are different as 
when applied to a proposition containing more than one element they give rise to 
different constant functions. 
But any Church numeral, i.e. any term of the form (hp:Prop) (hf:p+p) 
(Ax: P) f”x for some natural number n, yields a function g which is not constant 
as can be seen when comparing g (m)(id)( zero) = zero with g (m)(id) 
(succ(zer0)) = succ(zer0). 
Thus for any natural number i the object e, is different from any Church 
numeral. 0 
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 show that already in the most basic cases the induction 
principle fails. More generally the following theorem holds. 
Theorem 2.3. For polymorphic representations of arbitrary nonempty free data struc- 
tures the interpretation in our model contains in$niteiy many nonstandard elements. 
For polymorphic representations of empty free data structures the interpretation in 
our model gives the empty proposition. 
Proof. Iff,, . ,J;, are operation symbols with arity a, = p!,, -+ . . . -+pi,arcl,-+ P,+~;,+, 
for i= 1,. . , n where the p,,, are included in the list p,, . . . ,pk and at least one 
term of sort p, can be built up from the operation symbols f,, . , . ,&, then for any 
natural numberj the algorithm Am,. . . . Amk.nmk+,. . . . Amk+,,.Amk+,,+,.j realizes 
an element eJ of the proposition (Vp,:Prop) . . . (Vp,:Prop) (a, +. * .+ a,, +pC) 
which, when applied to an arbitrary proposition, gives rise to a constant function. 
As the proposition J@ is isomorphic to w and any free data structure can be 
giidelized in infinitely many different ways the syntactically denotable elements of 
the proposition give rise to nonconstant functions. Therefore all the syntactically 
definable objects are different from all objects e, where j E w. 
If there is no way of building up a term of sort p, from the signature under 
consideration then the interpretation of the proposition (Vp,:Prop) . . . (Vp,:Prop) 
(a,+...+ a,, + pi) is empty as there exists an effective structure of the signature 
above where p, is interpeted by the empty proposition. 0 
4. Underivability of several forms of the axiom of choice 
First we prove an auxiliary lemma. 
Lemma 4.1. For any nonempty w-set X the proposition (VP: Prop) (X + p) + p contains 
injinitely many diflerent elements. But for the empty w-set Q the proposition 
(Vp:Prop) (Q+p)-+p is empty. 
7’hu.s for any w-set X we have that X is empty iff (Vp:Prop) (X +p) +p is empty. 
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Proof. For any nonempty o-set X and i E w the algoithm An4m.Ak.i realizes some 
element of the proposition (Vp:Prop) (X + p) + p, since if [X + p] is nonempty then 
p is nonempty due to the assumption that X is nonempty and therefore p contains 
an element realized by Ak.i. 
For any proposition p the proposition O-+ p contains exactly one object i,,. 
Thus, if there were an object ,f in the proposition (Vp:Prop) (g-p) +p then for 
any proposition p we would have an object S( p)(i,) in p. But this would mean 
that any proposition is nonempty which is not true in our model and therefore 
(Vp:Prop) (0 + p) + p is empty. 
The equivalence follows since we have a complete case analysis of the inhabited- 
ness of X. 0 
Using Lemma 4.1 we can show that the interpretation of the existential quantification 
of a family of propositions indexed over an arbitrary type is nonempty provided 
that for some element of the type the corresponding proposition is nonempty. 
Lemma 4.2. Let X be an w-set and for any x E X let p(x) be a proposition. Then the 
proposition (3x:X) p(x) 3 (Vq:Prop) ((Vx:X) (p(x)+ q))+ q is nonempty ijf for 
some x E X the proposition p(x) is nonempty. 
Proof. Obviously, (Vx:X) (p(x) + q) is isomorphic to the type ((1 x:X) p(x)) + q 
and therefore (3x:X) p(x) is isomorphic to (Vq:Prop) (((I x:X) p(x)) + q) + q. 
From Lemma 4.1 we know that (Vq:Prop) (((2 x:X) p(x))+ q)+ q is nonempty 
iff the type (1 x:X) p(x) is nonempty. But due to the definition of strong sum types 
we know that the type (1 x:X) p(x) is nonempty iff for some x E X the proposition 
p(x) is nonempty. 0 
Now we are able to prove that the axiom of unique choice is not derivable in 
CoC since it does not hold in our model. 
Theorem 4.3. The following proposition, called AC!, is empty in our model: 
(VA:Prop) (VB:Prop) (VC : A+ B + Prop) 
Unique(A, B, C)+ (Vx:A) (3y:B) C(x)(y) 
+ (3f: A+ B) (Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)), 
where Unique(A, B, C) abbreviates 
(Vx:A) (Vy:B) (Vz:B) C(x)(y)+ C(x)(z)+Eq,(y, z) 
and Eq, stands for Leibniz equality, i.e. Eq,,(u, v) 2 (VQ : B + Prop) Q(u) + Q(v). 
Proof. First a remark on Leibniz equality. For any type B and any objects u, u in 
B the proposition Eq,( u, v) is empty if u # v (choose for Q a mapping such that 
Q(u) is nonempty and Q(v) is empty) and contains infinitely many different elements 
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if u = u (for any natural numbers i, j with i #j the algorithms 4n.Am.Ak.i and 
nn.Am4k.j realize different objects of Eq,( u, u), and different from all these objects 
is the object realized by the algorithm An.Am.m). 
Now let us show that AC! is not realized in our model. 
For A we take Nat+Nat and for B we take Nat. For C we put the predicate 
which for g : Nat + Nat and n:m gives the proposition True if n is the least Code1 
number of g and the proposition False otherwise where True stands for the proposi- 
tion having exactly one element, i.e. [Q+ w J where 0 is the empty w-set, and False 
stands for the empty proposition, namely 0. 
As any g :m-+m is realizable any such g is a total recursive function and 
therefore there exists a least Code1 number coding it. Thus for any g:m+w if 
n and n’are least Giidel numbers for g they must be equal. Therefore the proposition 
Unique(A, B, C) is realizable. 
As for any object g of type J&t+w there exists a (unique) n of type Nat 
with C(g)(n) nonempty by Lemma 4.2 we get that for any object x in A the 
proposition (3~: B) C(x)(y) is nonempty and contains an object realized by Am.0. 
Therefore the proposition (tlx:A)(3y:B) C(x)(y) is realizable by e.g. An.Am.0. 
But the proposition (3f: A+ B)(Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)) cannot be realized since other- 
wise, again by Lemma 4.2, there would exist an objectf; of the type [h&t+ b&l + I&t, 
i.e. a computable extensional function from [Nat-+@] to J&t such that the proposi- 
tion (Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)) is realizable. This would mean that for any g of type 
Nat-+Nat the objectf(g) of type J&t is the least Code1 number for g. But, obviously, 
this contradicts the continuity of the functionf which is guaranteed by the Kreisel- 
Lacombe-Shoenfield Theorem, cf. [5], since the (least) GGdel number of a total 
recursive function is not determined by an initial segment of this total recursive 
function. 
Thus we have shown that for appropriate choices of A, B and C the first two 
premisses are realizable but not the conclusion! Therefore the proposition AC! is 
not realizable in our model. 0 
Thus we have proven that a uniform version of the axiom of unique choice is 
not valid in our model. Even for a less uniform version we can prove that it fails 
in our model. 
Theorem 4.4. Let A and B be propositions which are syntactically expressable in CoC 
and nontrivial in the sense that they contain infinitely many objects (all otherpropositions 
are either empty or contain e.xactly one element). Then the proposition 
(VC:A+ B+Prop) 
Unique(A, B, C) + (Vx:A) (Sly: B) C(c)(y) 
+ (3f: A+ B) (Vx:A) (C(x)(f(x)) 
is not realizable in our model. 
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Proof. The collection of all set-theoretic, not necessarily realizable functions from 
A to B is uncountable as A is infinite and f3 contains more than one element. But 
there are at most countably many realizable functions from A to B. Thus, for reasons 
of cardinality, there exists a set-theoretic function f from A to B which is not 
realizable. Choose for C the family of propositions representing the graph of i i.e. 
C(x)(y) is True if y =f(x) and False otherwise. Of course, the predicate C is not 
definable in CoC but nevertheless it exists in our model! 
Then, of course, the propositions Unique(A, B, C) and (Vx:A) (3y:B) C(x)(y) 
are realizable in our model, but (3f: A + B) (Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)) is not realizable as 
that would imply that f is realizable in contradiction to our assumption that f is 
not realizable. 0 
An even more liberal form of the axiom of unique choice claims the validity the 
proposition 
Unique(A, B, C) --, (Vx:A) (3y:B) C(x)(y) 
+ (3f: A + B) (Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)) 
for all syntactically representable A, B, C. But even this form of the axiom of unique 
choice is not true in our model as is shown by the next theorem. 
Theorem 4.5. There are syntactically representable A, B, C such that the proposition 
Unique(A, B, C) + (Vx:A) (3~: B) C(x)(y) 
+ (3f: A-+ B) (Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)) 
is not realizable in our model. 
Proof. Take for B the type PolyNat, for A the type PolyNat+ PolyNat and for 
C(f)(n) the formalization of the predicate n = 0 and f(m) f 0 for all m or n = 1 
and f(m) = 0 for some m. Of course, here 0 stands for (the denotation of) the 
Church numeral (Ap:Prop) (Af : p + p 1 (Ax:p) x. For this choice the premisses 
Unique(A, B, C) and (Vx:A) (3y:B) C(x)(y) are realizable in our model, but the 
conclusion is not realizable as this-we will show-would allow to decide whether 
a total recursive function is constant with value 0 E w. But this is impossible due to 
the Kreisel-Lacombe-Schoenfield Theorem since the property of being constant 
with value OE w is not determined by the behaviour on finitely many arguments. 
There is a surjective realizable map r from (the interpretation of) PolyNat to Nat 
associating with any object n of PolyNat the object n(Nat)(succ)(zero) of type J@t. 
Furthermore there is a realizable map e from Nat to (the interpretation of) PolyNat 
associating with any n in Nat, i.e. n is a natural number, the interpretation of 
(Ap:Prop) (Af:p+p) (hx:p)f”x (th e nth Church numerical), i.e. an object in (the 
interpretation of) PolyNat. Due to its construction the map e is a splitting of r, i.e. 
ro e = id,. Therefore the problem whether a function g from Nat to Nat is constantly -- 
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zero is equivalent to the problem whether eogor is the constant function from (the 
interpretation of) PolyNat to (the interpretation of) PolyNat with value 0, the 
(interpretation of) the 0th Church numeral. 
Now assume that proposition (3f: A -+ B) (Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)) is realizable, then 
this latter problem and therefore also the halting problem is decidable as shown by 
the following argument. 
From the assumption it follows by Lemma 4.2 that there is a realizable function 
f which for any function g : PolyNat + PolyNat gives an objectf(g) of type PolyNat 
which is equal to the interpretation of the 0th Church numeral if g is constant with 
value 0, the interpretation of the 0th Church numeral in PolyNat, and equal to the 
interpretation of the 1st Church numeral otherwise. But then the computable function 
rof decides whether a computable endo-function on (the interpretation of) PolyNat 
is constant with value 0, the interpretation of the 0th Church numeral. 
But then-as there is an obvious realizable isomorphism between Nat and w-the 
realizable mapping d : [Nat + Nat] +Nat associating with any realizable function g 
from Nat to Nat the object d(g) = r(f(eogor)) in Nat would provide a decision -- 
procedure for the property whether a total recursive function is constant with value 
OEw. 0 
5. Related work 
The author has been directed to the problems dealt with above by a question of 
Thierry Coquand. We would like to take the opportunity here to thank him for his 
stimulating questions! 
Coquand has proven syntactically in CoC that the axiom of choice for propositional 
types and the proposition (Vp : Prop) ((p + I) -+ I) + p together imply the proposition 
that any proposition contains at most one proof object. The proof idea is that if 
there were a proposition q containing more than one element then the proposition 
(Vp:Prop) p + q would contain more elements than the disjoint union of all proposi- 
tions and therefore more elements than any proposition, especially more elements 
than (Vp:Prop) p + q itself. But to draw the conclusion one needs the principle of 
proof by contradiction, i.e. (Vp:Prop) ((p + i) -$ I) + p. 
Now Coquand’s question was whether there exists a model of CoC where 
(Vp:Prop) ((p-I)+ ~)+p is valid but which is nontrivial in the sense that the 
proposition expressing that all propositions contain at most one proof object is not 
valid. Of course, due to his result this would imply that in such a model the axiom 
of choice is not valid. To find such a model was the original motivation of our work. 
But later we have seen that the whole problem can be solved by purely semantical 
methods without reference to a complicated formal derivation in CoC. 
Stefano Berardi has shown by semi-semantical methods that the axiom of choice 
is not derivable, see [I] where a related result due to Geuvers is described. He has 
used an informal notion of model for a version of CoC which does not allow 
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judgements expressing the equality of objects of a propositional type. Essentially 
in his model there are only two propositions: the empty proposition and the 
proposition containing all terms of untyped A-calculus module pq-conversion. 
6. Open problems of proof-theoretic character 
It remains an open problem of intrinsically proof-theoretic character whether for 
any syntactically representable A, B, C and derivable witnesses of the propositions 
Unique(A, B, C) and (Vx:A) (3y:B) C(x)(y) one can find a derivable witness of 
the proposition (3f: A + B) (Vx:A) C(x)(f(x)). In other words it is an open problem 
whether the axiom of unique choice holds as a schematic derived rule. 
In [7,8] we have shown that in the full PER model the strong sum (C x:p) q(x) 
of a family of propositions q(x) indexed over a proposition p is itself isomorphic 
to a proposition(al type). In [4] it has been shown that in the full PER model for 
any proposition p the proposition (Vq:Prop) (p + q) -+ q is isomorphic to p. These 
two results together imply that for any family of propositions q(x) indexed over a 
proposition p the proposition (3x:p) q(,x) is isomorphic to the strong sum 
(1 x:p) q(x). Thus it would be semantically meaningful to add to CoC a constant 
for the projection on the second component of objects of a strong sum type together 
with the obvious axioms for projections (the first projection can be expressed already 
in CoC!). But it is not clear what is the impact of this extension on the operational 
properties of the underlying functional language such as confluence or normalization. 
The motivation is that it would be nice to be able to express inside the calculus 
an operation decomposing a proof object for the proposition (3x:p) q(x) into an 
object x0 of p and a proof object for 4(x,,). This would provide a strengthening of 
the axiom of choice and allow one to construct proof objects for propositions 
expressing the correctness of programs extracted from constructive proofs as can 
be done e.g. in Martin-LGf’s intuitionistic type theory. The practical benefit is 
obvious: one wants to reuse (parts of) correctness proofs of programs when trans- 
forming them to semantically equivalent versions having a better computational 
complexity. 
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